Build log

Why There Will Never Be a Palmer Luckey From the UK

A short, frustrating attempt to bring serious technology to UK defence procurement, and the structural reason brilliant people leave the sector before they ever get started.

I live five miles from Portsmouth. Proud maritime history, a serious military presence, and a local economy stitched through with names you would recognise. BAE Systems. IBM. If it is connected to the UK's war machine, which these days looks increasingly assembled from Lego, it has a presence here.

This was before Panamorphix. At the time I was running Simulation Creation, working with a team of brilliant Ukrainian engineers on XR work. Activations, FOOH, WebXR, but also the more serious end of it: full simulation environments. This team had already delivered major projects in pharma and oil and gas safety. Serious people, serious track record. I thought there might be a genuine opportunity in defence, so I started going to the local meetups.

One of the organisations I joined was the South Central Regional Defence and Security Cluster. I will let the acronym speak for itself.

I went to four meetings. A pattern emerged quickly. It made no sense to me until, eventually, it made complete sense.

The Problem Was Never the Hard Part

The theme of the first meeting was a call for an underwater and air early warning system for drones. I sat there and mentally solved it within twenty minutes.

Specialist cameras. Cinema-grade autofocus, LiDAR-driven. Leica Nocturne lenses at f0.95, fast enough that you barely need supplementary lighting. All of it feeding into a YOLO model, the kind built for real-time single-pass object detection. By the end of the talk I had the architecture roughly mapped in my head. Not because I am exceptional. Because the technical problem genuinely was not that hard, if you had spent any time at the intersection of imaging hardware and computer vision.

I went to speak to the Innovate UK representative afterwards, fairly pleased with myself.

He told me that startups have to go through Primes.

What a Prime Actually Means

I asked what that meant. Primes, it turns out, are the BAE Systems of the world. The large incumbent contractors that MOD procurement is structured to run through. If you are outside that structure, however good your idea is, you do not take it to market. You take it to a Prime.

Read that again. You take your idea, your design, your genuinely good invention, the thing that might actually save lives or give an early warning advantage, and you hand it to a company that is also, by any reasonable definition, your direct competitor. You unload it to them and hope for the best.

I am not singling out BAE specifically. They were simply the most prominent name across all four meetings I attended. The structure is the issue, not any single company within it.

This is anti-competitive by design. It is open to every kind of abuse you can imagine, from quiet appropriation of an idea to simply being told no and watching something suspiciously similar appear eighteen months later under someone else's name. And it is, as far as I could establish, the only route to market that exists.

Why the Best People Leave Before You Ever Hear About Them

This is the part that actually matters, and it is why the title of this post is not hyperbole.

Palmer Luckey did not ask anyone's permission. He built Oculus, sold it, then built Anduril directly into the defence sector on his own terms, with his own capital structure, answerable to no incumbent gatekeeper standing between his ideas and the people who needed them. That path exists in the United States. It does not meaningfully exist here.

The UK has the people. I want to be completely clear about that, because the easy and lazy conclusion is that we lack talent. We do not. The engineers I was working with were as good as anyone I have encountered anywhere. The problem is not capability. The problem is that the odds of getting a genuinely good idea from concept to deployment, without first surrendering it to a competitor, are stacked so heavily against you that anyone clever enough to recognise the structure early simply leaves. They go build in fintech, in health tech, in any sector where the route to market does not require handing your work to the company you are trying to displace.

By the time most people figure this out, they have already left. Which means the talent pool inside UK defence innovation is, by self-selection, depleted of exactly the people who would have been most dangerous to the status quo.

The Third Meeting

By the third meetup, held at Portsmouth University, I had stopped being diplomatic about it. I pulled the Innovate UK military representative aside and told him plainly that the game was rigged, and that I was out. I told him I would take the work to the Saudis instead.

I will not, and that was never really the point. The point was watching his face when I said it. He had nothing to offer in response. He just nodded, because he already knew. He was not the villain in this. He was a decent person operating inside a structure he did not design and has no power to dismantle, and the nod told me everything about how aware he was of exactly that.

That is most of the story. Not a conspiracy. Not incompetence at the individual level. Just a procurement structure that quietly guarantees its own mediocrity, one good idea at a time, handed to a competitor, and never seen again.

There will never be a Palmer Luckey from the UK. Not because we lack one. Because the system makes sure we never find out.

The Actual Consequence

Here is the part I did not understand at the time, sitting in that room at Portsmouth University. Those four meetings were not just a frustrating dead end. They were the catalyst for a permanent decision.

Two years later, Constellation is genuinely capable of military-grade intelligence work. The architecture is there. The capability is real, and I am not being coy about that. What is also real, and was decided long before Constellation existed in any form, is that it will never be sold into military procurement. Not because the technology is not good enough. Because I already know exactly what that route to market costs, and I have no intention of handing a serious capability to a Prime and hoping for the best a second time.

The four meetups did not just teach me how the system works. They drew a line I have not crossed since, and do not intend to. Some doors, once you have seen what is actually behind them, are better left shut by choice rather than forced open by persistence.